Submarine cables under the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz carry one-third of India's internet traffic — and both corridors are now in an active conflict zone.
Team Sahi
When we think about global conflicts, the immediate concerns are usually oil prices, trade disruptions, or geopolitical instability. But there is another invisible layer at risk — one that powers everything from UPI payments to cloud computing to stock trading platforms.
Beneath the waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea lies a dense web of submarine fibre-optic cables that carries over 95% of international internet traffic. With an active conflict now underway in West Asia since late February 2026, these cables are no longer just theoretically vulnerable. They are directly exposed.
The Indian government is already treating this as a strategic emergency. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) have been working together on plans to build indigenous cable repair and laying vessels. A budget of approximately ₹3,000–4,000 crore has been proposed, with retrofitting Indian Navy vessels under consideration as an interim measure. India currently has no cable repair ship of its own.
This is no longer a hypothetical risk. In September 2025, cables SMW4 (operated by Tata Communications) and IMEWE were severed near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, causing internet slowdowns across India, Pakistan, and the UAE. Earlier, in February and March 2024, multiple cables including AAE-1, SEACOM, and the Europe India Gateway (EIG) were damaged in the Red Sea, disrupting connectivity across Asia and Africa.
The situation has since escalated significantly. On March 2–3, 2026, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officially declared the Strait of Hormuz closed and threatened any vessel attempting passage. For the first time in modern history, both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are simultaneously closed to commercial traffic. Twelve of the 17 submarine cable systems in the Gulf now have at least one segment passing through active conflict zones.
Since these networks are interconnected, disruptions in one area force traffic onto alternate routes, straining existing infrastructure and increasing latency across the board.
So what happens if these cables are disrupted, and how deeply could it affect India's digital ecosystem? Let us break it down.
Despite the popular belief that satellites power the internet, the reality is far more grounded — literally on the ocean floor.
Submarine cables form the physical backbone of global digital communication. They transmit massive volumes of data at speeds and capacities that satellites simply cannot match, supporting:
What makes them so critical is also what makes them vulnerable: their concentration. 17 submarine cables run through the Red Sea alone, carrying approximately 30% of all intercontinental internet traffic. Rather than being spread evenly across the ocean floor, many converge at narrow maritime chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea chief among them.
For India, this region is absolutely central to global connectivity. Approximately one-third of India's westbound internet traffic — data flowing to Europe and North America — passes through cable systems in or near this corridor. This is not just consumer data. It includes critical banking systems, cloud workloads, and India's rapidly growing AI and data centre infrastructure in the Gulf.
Key cable systems connecting India to the world through this region include:
Several major Indian telecom and digital infrastructure companies are directly exposed to disruptions in undersea cables near the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
Jio is a consortium member of AAE-1 and is building next-generation cables including IAX (India Asia Xpress) and IEX (India Europe Xpress), routed through the Indian Ocean and Red Sea corridor. Damage or prolonged repair delays on these systems would directly affect its international bandwidth and cloud-connectivity services.
Airtel relies on SEA-ME-WE 4 and IMEWE, both running through the Arabian Sea–Gulf–Europe route — the same corridor now at risk. In February 2025, Airtel became the first Indian operator to land the newer SEA-ME-WE 6 cable, adding some redundancy. However, its legacy systems remain exposed, and it experienced disruptions directly when Red Sea cables were cut in September 2025.
Tata owns and operates TGN-Gulf (Tata Global Network–Gulf) and is a major stakeholder in SEA-ME-WE 4. These cables carry a substantial share of India's data traffic to Europe and the Middle East. Tata also operates five cable landing stations in India — three in Mumbai and one each in Chennai and Cochin. A prolonged disruption in the Hormuz or Red Sea area would hit Tata's international wholesale and enterprise-connectivity business hardest.
While Vi is primarily focused on domestic mobile services, it still depends on the same international cable ecosystem for roaming and cross-border data partnerships. Congestion or higher wholesale transit costs on these routes can indirectly squeeze its network budgets and roaming service quality.
The real-world impact is already visible. In early 2026, Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) — the French state-owned company contracted to lay Meta's 2Africa Pearls cable through the Persian Gulf — issued force majeure notices to its clients, declaring it can no longer safely operate in the Persian Gulf due to active military operations.
The conflict that escalated in West Asia in late February 2026 has introduced a category of risk that is fundamentally different from accidental cable cuts or routine wear and tear.
What has changed:
The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are simultaneously closed to commercial traffic — a first in modern history. Twelve of the 17 Gulf cable systems have at least one segment in active conflict zones. Iran possesses midget submarines and diver-delivery vehicles capable of operating at cable-laying depths; the Persian Gulf averages just 50 metres at the Strait of Hormuz. Repair vessels cannot safely enter affected areas, meaning even minor disruptions could persist for months.
Submarine cables, despite their engineered durability, are not immune to damage. In the shallow waters of the Strait of Hormuz, they are particularly exposed to naval manoeuvres, underwater explosions, drifting anchors, and sea mines.
This is arguably the more serious risk. Under normal peacetime conditions, the median restoration time for a damaged submarine cable is already around 40 days. In a conflict zone where repair vessels cannot safely enter, even minor damage can remain unrepaired for the entire duration of hostilities.
India currently has no cable repair vessel of its own. It depends entirely on two international consortia — one based in Dubai, one in Singapore — both of which cannot operate in active conflict zones. The DoT and NSCS are working to change this, with proposals to retrofit Indian Navy vessels and a dedicated vessel programme budgeted at ₹3,000–4,000 crore. However, these remain works-in-progress.
A conflict in the Middle East is unlikely to shut down India's internet entirely. But it can — and already is — slowing it, straining it, and revealing the hidden dependencies that power India's digital economy.
India currently hosts just 17 international subsea cables across 16 landing stations, with at least 11 nearing the end of their economic life. The TRAI chairman has publicly called for a 10x expansion of India's subsea cable infrastructure. As data becomes as strategically important as oil or electricity, protecting these underwater networks is no longer just a technical priority. It is a national security imperative.